نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، واحد کرج، کرج، ایران.
2 استادیار، گروه حقوق خصوصی، واحد کرج، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، کرج، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The dynamics of international political economy have made foreign investment arbitration a central mechanism for resolving disputes between host states and investors. However, the transnational and binding nature of arbitration creates fundamental normative friction with the doctrine of judicial sovereignty and the foundations of Imamiyah jurisprudence in Iran's legal system. Adopting a descriptive-analytical method and a "governmental jurisprudence" approach, this research seeks to explain how the dialectic between global capital integration and safeguarding the Islamic community's economic authority can be managed. The theoretical framework is based on "public interest" (maslahat) and "secondary rulings" (ahkam thanawiyyah). Within this paradigm, the legitimacy of arbitration is neither intrinsically good nor evil; rather, its validation is teleological and contingent upon establishing a binding public interest for the Islamic system. Findings indicate that the unconditional acceptance of arbitration risks violating the rule of Nafi-e Sabil (denial of dominion) and restricting national sovereignty. However, by utilizing "preventive engineering of contractual clauses" in bilateral treaties, governmental jurisprudence can transform arbitration into a strategic lever for balancing national interests. The research concludes that maslahat operates not as an emergency exception but as a structural super-rule, serving as the sole catalyst for establishing normative balance between the principle of contractual obligation and the rule prohibiting domination in international investment law.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]